In this paper we consider a modified version of Diamond's OLG model. We show, first, that dynamic inefficiency may be relevant when the presence of imperfect competition is taken into account. Second, if fiscal policy is used to avoid inefficiency and maintain an optimal capital intensity, the required debt ratio will be inversely related to the growth rate. Third, austerity policies -reductions in government consumption and entitlement programs for the old generation -raise the required debt ratio.
Introduction
provides a classic analysis of public debt in dynamically inefficient economies. His well-known results gain real-world significance insofar as actual economies become dynamically inefficient in the absence of public debt. The general consensus seems to be that this is not the case: empirically the rate of return on capital appears to exceed the rate of growth (Abel, Mankiw, and Zeckhauser 1989) .
The empirical argument has two potential weaknesses. To ascertain the need for fiscal policy and public debt one would need to evaluate the rate of return in a state without public debt; it is not sufficient to show that dynamic efficiency may hold if the evidence applies to an economy with significant amounts of public debt. Second, the standard efficiency criterion -that the rate of return exceed the growth rate -is based on the identification of the rate of return with the marginal product of capital. This identification breaks down under imperfect competition.
Our analysis shows a relationship between debt and economic growth. The causal link in this relationship unambiguously runs from growth to debt: a low growth rate generates a high steady-growth ratio of debt to income if fiscal policy is used to avoid dynamic inefficiency and maintain an optimal capital intensity. This theoretical result has implications for the interpretation of empirical correlations between growth and debt.
1 The analysis also shows that austerity policies have paradoxical effects: reductions in government consumption and in entitlement programs for the old generation raise the longrun debt ratio.
OLG models with imperfect competition have been developed by, among others, d 'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gerard-Varet (1995) , Pagano (1990) and Jacobsen and Schultz (1994) . Like our analysis in this paper, these models examine the potential usefulness of fiscal policy. But this similarity masks fundamental differences in the structure of the models and the nature of the fiscal effects. Assuming Cournot competition, d 'Aspremont et al. show that fiscal policy can be used to influence the equilibrium markup which -along with an elastic labor supply -determines equilibrium employment; the model has no capital and no dynamic inefficiency, and the government balances its budget in each period. The details are different in Pagano and Jacobsen and Schultz, but the fiscal effects run through changes in competition and market power in these papers too. By contrast, the markup is constant in our setting, and we treat the labor supply as inelastic; our focus is on dynamic efficiency and the dynamics of public debt.
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Public debt dynamics have been examined in an OLG setting by Chalk (2000) . Assuming a constant primary deficit per worker, he finds that even if the economy is dynamically inefficient when public debt is zero, a constant primary deficit may be unsustainable. Moreover, in those cases where a primary deficit is sustainable, convergence is to a steady growth path that is dynamically inefficient. These results invite several questions. Why would a government want to pursue policies of this kind? Why focus on trajectories that keep a constant primary deficit? Economic analysis of monetary policy typically looks for optimal policies (or policy rules), given some welfare function and a model of how the economy operates. Our analysis of fiscal policy is in a similar spirit.
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Section 2 presents the basic model with imperfect competition. Taxation and public debt are added in section 3. Section 4 discusses implications of the analysis, and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
An OLG model with imperfect competition
Production There is a continuum of young agents indexed by j with j∈ [0, L t ]. The population grows at the rate n, L t+1 = (1+n)L t . Agents live for two periods: they work in the first period and live off their savings in the second. In addition to a labor endowment, each agent has the know-how to produce a particular intermediate good using capital and labor. A CES production function describes the production of the intermediate goods y jt :
where k jt and l jt denote the inputs of capital and labor in the production of good j at time t. Intermediate goods are used to produce final output (Y t ):
where ε is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. A growing population -a growing number of intermediate inputs -would be a source of productivity increases and growth in per capita income if the multiplicative term A t were constant. Important as they may be, these issues are not the concerns of this paper; to simplify, we therefore assume that
With this specification, population growth will have no direct effect on productivity.
The final good can be used for consumption or transformed (costlessly) into capital for use in the production of intermediate goods. There is perfect competition in the final goods market and firms maximize profits,
where p t and p jt are the prices of final output and intermediate goods.
The first-order condition yields
which, along with (2) and a zero-profit condition, implies that
and
Using the final good as numeraire, we assume p t = 1 for all t.
Intermediate good producers maximize profits subject to the isoelastic demand function (6) and the production function (1): 
where w t , r t and δ are the real wage, the real interest rate and the rate of capital depreciation. The first-order conditions give a mark-up equation:
where c t represents the unit cost:
The unit cost is the same for all input producers. Thus, p jt is the same for all j, and, using (7) and (9),
Relative factor demands are given by
and integrating (12) over [0, L t ], the aggregate capital stock K t satisfies
Equations (10) and (11) give us a factor-price frontier; we can write the real wage as a function of the interest rate:
Saving There is full employment and we take the labor supply to be inelastic.
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Normalizing the supply of an individual worker to one, the budget constraint is given by
where c 1, t and c 2, t+1 are the levels of consumption when the agent is young and old; π t is the agent's profits from production of an intermediate good.
Using (9)- (12), we have
where η(r t ) is the share of labor in unit cost:
The utility function for a young agent in period t is commonly specified using a general CIES form,
where θ and ρ are the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the discount rate. Using this specification, the maximization problem yields an expression for optimal consumption:
where the young generation's saving rate s t can be written
In the logarithmic case (θ→1 and ρ
Given the purpose of this paper -to examine complications from imperfect competition -we keep the saving side simple and focus on the logarithmic case (θ→1, s t = s).
The capital stock in period t+1 is determined by the young generation's saving in period t (S t ):
Using (14) and (16), equation (22) can be written as a first-order difference equation of the interest rate.
Equation (23) fully determines the trajectory of the interest rate.
Steady states
In a steady state we have r t = r t+1 = r for all t and, substituting for w(r) and π(r), equation (23) can be re-written
As shown in Appendix A, 1. in the case of 0 ≤ γ < 1, equation (24) has a unique root r∈ (-δ, ∞) . This fixed point is stable. 2. in the case of γ < 0, equation (24) has two distinct roots r∈(-δ, ∞) if σ is sufficiently large (given the values of the other parameters). Intuitively, if σ is too low, it becomes impossible to accumulate capital at the required rate n for any non-negative level of consumption, and the equation has no solution (cf. the Leontief example in Appendix B). The smaller root for r is (locally) stable; the larger root is unstable. The large solution may require a negative real wage rate and thus may not be meaningful, even disregarding stability questions.
The term on the right-hand side of (24) -(w+π)L/K -represents the young agents' income normalized by the capital stock. This income-capital ratio is increasing in the interest rate in the neighborhood of stable steady states. This property can be used for comparative statics. First, an increase in the growth rate n or a fall in the saving rate s (a rise in the discount rate ρ) requires an increase in the incomecapital ratio in order to maintain a steady state. Thus, the interest rate has to go up. The equilibrium interest rate, second, is inversely related to the degree of market power. An increase in the mark-up factor -a reduction in the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods (ε) -raises the income-capital ratio for a given interest rate; the real interest rate therefore needs to be lowered to keep the income-capital ratio constant at (1+n)/s.
Dynamic efficiency
The condition for efficiency is for the net marginal product of capital to exceed the growth rate of the labor force. Under perfect competition, this criterion can be re-stated as r > n. The introduction of imperfect competition modifies the efficiency criterion. Imperfect competition, first, drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the interest rate. With our specification, the marginal product of capital equals ε δ δ ε
and the efficiency criterion can be written
The wedge implies that r > n is sufficient but not necessary for dynamic efficiency; imperfect competition relaxes the condition for dynamic efficiency for any given value of r. But the mark-up factor ε/(ε-1) influences r. More specifically, an increase in the markup decreases r in stable steady states and, using equation (24), it is readily seen that a decrease in ε (corresponding to a rise in the markup) must also lead to a decline in the equilibrium value of the marginal product of capital (see Appendix B). Thus, an increase in market power tends to tighten the condition for dynamic efficiency. More importantly, biases arise if the marginal product of capital is being evaluated by looking at the ratio of gross profits (pY-wL) to capital: under imperfect competition some of the profits are monopoly rents that have no relation to marginal productivity. 5 The bias is particularly clear in the simple Leontief case (see 5 Abel, Mankiw, and Zeckhauser (1989) use the ratio (Y-wL)/K in their empirical evaluation of dynamic efficiency. They acknowledge that their analysis "depends on the assumption that capital receives its marginal product, an assumption that excludes the possibility that capital income includes substantial monopoly profit" (p.7). They suggest, however, that their calculation is not badly distorted by monopoly profits. In support of this view they point to average values of about one for Tobin's q, arguing that "if a large part of profits reflected returns to something other than physical capital, one would suspect that the firm's market value would substantially exceed the value of their physical assets." (p.10) This faith in Tobin's q as a good indicator of the importance of monopoly profits seems questionable.
Appendix C): producers with excess capacity receive positive gross profits even though the gross marginal product is zero. More generally, using the model in this section, we have the following inequality:
The interpretation of (26) is intuitive. The rate of gross profits is the sum of r+δ and the ratio of the entire pure profit (profit margins over the sum of interest cost and wage cost) to capital; the marginal product of capital, on the other hand, is the sum of r+δ and a fraction of the ratio of pure profits to capital: only the profit margin on the cost of capital is included. Thus, the upward bias comes from the profit margin on wage cost η δ η ε ε values, the ratio of (annual) gross profits to capital exceeds the (annual) gross marginal product by four percentage points.
Public debt
Extending the model, we introduce a government that consumes (G t ), levies lumpsum taxes on the young and old generations ( T ) and has debt (B t ).
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Young households save in the form of fixed capital and government bonds; these assets, we assume, are perfect substitutes and have the same rate of return, r t .
The numerical value of the marginal product of capital -like the output-capital ratio, the wage rate w, the rate of depreciation δ, and the rate of return r -depends on the length of the accounting period. The numbers refer to annualized rates. 8 Since the labor supply is taken to be inelastic, the lumpsum assumption only matters for the old generation.
Equation (22) now takes the form
while the public sector budget constraint is given by
The young generation in period t maximizes utility subject to a modified constraint, π τ φ
where
This gives the following solution for saving
Substituting (30) into (27) and dividing through by L t , equations (27) and (28) 
where g t ≡G t /L t and b t ≡B t /L t . Fiscal policy clearly affects the outcome but that leaves open the determination of an appropriate policy. For present purposes it may be reasonable to assume -somewhat heroically -that government consumption has been set at an optimal level, g t = g. This leaves the two tax parameters, τ t and φ t . The achievement of dynamic efficiency is one obvious criterion for deciding these tax rates. To be more specific, assume that the capital intensity associated with the interest rate r * is considered socially optimal in a steady state. 9 One can now look for combinations of τ t and φ t that maintain r t = r * .
Taking taxes on the old as exogenous and constant (φ t+1 = φ t = φ), equations (31) and (32) give us the required trajectory of the debt ratio:
where π φ * * * * * * (14), (16) and (13).
10 Solving (33) for the steady state value of b t , we have:
By assumption, the steady state is socially optimal and therefore dynamically efficient. The value of b * can be positive or negative, depending on parameters. In cases where b * > 0, however, an attempt to eliminate the debt could lead to dynamic inefficiency. Putting it differently, the efficiency properties of a hypothetical no-debt economy cannot be ascertained simply by observing that with public debt the economy is in fact efficient. To get some idea of the size of the bias, assume that the initial share of government bonds in total household wealth (capital plus government bonds) is 25%. With this initial composition of household wealth, the elimination of public debt will reduce the gross marginal product by about 25% if the production function is Cobb-Douglas; with plausible values of the initial (annualized) marginal product, this implies that the elimination of public debt reduces the marginal product by 2-3 percentage points (see Appendix D). The reduction in the marginal product will be larger (smaller) if the elasticity of substitution is below (above) one.
It should be noted, perhaps, that the designation of a socially optimal capital intensity does not depend on the presence of imperfect competition; the 10 The difference equation (33) is stable if a 1 < 1. The stability condition will be met if the saving rate s is sufficiently low (i.e., the discount rate ρ is sufficiently large). The stability properties of the equation are of limited interest, however: starting from some arbitrary initial values of k 0 and b 0 , it will not, in general, be optimal to jump directly to the steady-state value k(r * ) in period 1. The precise design of an optimal policy depends on the details of the social welfare function. expression in equation (34) holds for the any value of ε, including the special case of perfect competition when ε→∞. Putting it differently, the value of ε -the degree of imperfection -influences the precise values of r * and b * but not the general approach to determining these values.
Implications
Debt and growth Given the current focus on possible dangers of public debt, it is interesting to note that the required debt is inversely related to the growth rate n. Differentiating (34) with respect to n, we have
The sum of wage income and monopoly profits exceeds government consumption in actual data as well as for any plausible optimal path; thus w(r * )+π(r * ) > g.
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This inequality implies that ∂b * /∂n < 0. The inverse relation between growth and government debt is quite intuitive. The reason for the debt is that the young generation wants to save "too much". But the threshold defining "too much" depends on the growth rate: a higher growth rate implies that more fixed capital will be needed to employ the future generation and, consequently, that the required amount of public debt will be lower.
Austerity and debt Austerity programs typically include cuts in government consumption and reductions in entitlements like social security or medicare. These austerity measures can be distributionally regressive. Surprisingly, perhaps, from a long-run perspective they are also counterproductive on their own terms: they aggravate the "debt problem".
It is readily seen -using (34) -that the required debt (b) depends inversely on public consumption (g) and directly on the level of taxes on the old generation (φ). 12 An increase in g implies that consumption has to contract in order to maintain equilibrium in the product market. With a given φ, this is achieved by increasing taxes on the young. As a result the desired saving decreases; this, in turn, reduces the need for government debt as an outlet for saving. Analogously, 11 The share of government consumption in GDP is less than 30% in all OECD countries, well below the share of wages in income. 12 An inverse relation between debt and government consumption is obtained in a non-OLG setting by Schlicht (2006) and Ryoo and Skott (2013) .
with a given value of g, an increase in φ (corresponding to a reduction in entitlement programs for the old) must be accompanied by a reduction in τ in order to maintain the level of consumption and equilibrium in the goods market; the disposable income of the young increases, and the amount of public debt must increase to meet the rise in saving.
Debt and taxes
The debt ratio and the tax on the young are both endogenous, and the long-run correlation between them, not surprisingly,is ambiguous: it depends on the underlying shifts in exogenous variables or parameters. Equations (32) and (34) can be used to derive the steady-growth solution for the tax rate τ:
Thus, an increase in g raises τ and reduces b; an increase in φ reduces τ and raises b. It follows that shifts in g or φ produce a negative correlation between the steady-growth values of τ and b: high debt is associated with low taxes. But other parameter shifts yield a positive correlation; a fall in α, for instance, will raise the wage share and produce an increase in both b and τ if r * > n.
Conclusion
The possibility of a link between public debt and economic growth has received a great deal of attention following the publication of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010) . Assuming that a negative correlation can be found between debt and economic growth, the key question concerns causation. The analysis in this paper identifies a long-run causal link from growth to debt: a reduction in the long-run rate of growth will tend to produce an increase in the long-run debt ratio. We have also shown that austerity policies can be counterproductive on their own terms (as well as distributionally regressive): reductions in government consumption and/or in entitlement programs for the old increase public debt in the long run.
The model focuses on long-run outcomes (steady states). It has other obvious limitations. Most prominently, perhaps, we have assumed a closed economy. Open (and local) economies are in a very different position than sovereign countries that control their own currency; this paper says nothing about the open-economy issues. A second limitation is the neglect of heterogeneity within generations and questions of intra-generational distribution. Public debt may have regressive distributional effects if taxes on wage income are used to finance interest payments to the rich. The possible incentive effects of taxes, third, have been ignored; it should be noted, however, that a higher level of debt need not be associated with higher taxes (Section 4). The analysis of these and other complicating issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
Appendix A: Existence and stability of steady states
Existence To see the existence of the solution to (24), let us define
where R = r+δ. We then have two cases:
is concave and initially increasing but decreasing eventually. Therefore if σ is sufficiently large (for given values of ε and α), there exist two distinct roots, namely, R 1 and R 2 with R 1 < R 2 . Note that the concavity of f(R) implies
Stability The left-hand and the right-hand side of (23) are strictly decreasing in r t+1 and r t , respectively. Thus, (23) implies that r t+1 is strictly increasing in r t , i.e., dr t+1 /dr t > 0 for all r t . It follows that a fixed point of (23) 
The stability results now follow from the properties of the f-function (see above): (i) if 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, the unique stationary solution is stable; (ii) if γ < 0, the low solution for r is locally stable and the high solution is unstable. 
(1 ) ( )
Solving (C4) for the rate of interest and substituting the result back into the factor-price frontier, we have:
The steady growth path described by equations (C5)-(C6) is dynamically efficient: the net marginal product associated with a reduction in the capital-labor ratio exceeds the growth in the labor force (σ-δ > n). This high-interest path is unstable, however. The saving rate, s, is constant (given the logarithmic specification of the utility function); starting from the efficient path, a positive shock to w therefore raises the amount of saving, and the capital intensity increases in the next period to give K t+1 /L t+1 > λ/σ. The young workers' income (the wage rate plus profits) then rises to λ in subsequent periods, 14 and the economy will be following a steady growth path with excess capacity:
This steady-growth path is dynamically inefficient; the net marginal product of capital is equal to -δ < n; consumption could be increased by reducing investment (eliminating the excess capacity) and having each young generation use some of its saving to finance consumption for the old generation. 
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13 The solution for w becomes negative and non-meaningful if the monopoly rents are too large (a small ε) and/or the capital productivity is too large (a large σ). This is quite intuitive: under these conditions the saving decisions of the young generation will generate a growth rate of the capital stock that exceeds n even when the wage rate is zero.
14 The wage rate and the amount of profits will be 1 1 
Assume that the values of g and φ are kept unchanged. If the optimal steady state (associated with the initial debt-capital ratio of 1/3) has r * = n, it follows from (32) that the value of τ in the zero-debt steady state will also be unchanged, compared to its value in the optimal steady state. Using (D1) and assuming (plausibly) that 
